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Abstract
Transwarp-Conduit (TWC) is a protocol for message transfers between two smart-contract enabled blockchain
networks. Furthermore, we specify an application framework (leveraging the TWC protocol) that enables devel-
opers to define arbitrarily complex cross-blockchain applications, simply by
1. Deploying framework-compliant smart contracts and,
2. Hosting a TWC node (daemon process).
The TWC protocol is implementable without additional effort on part of the base blockchain protocol.1
1 Motivation
1.1 Scope
This work primarily focuses on public blockchains. Although vastly applicable, specific challenges pertaining to
interoperability between private-to-private and private-to-public chains are out of the scope of this work.
1.2 Applicability of Work
We have observed a proliferation of public blockchains, with over 600 public blockchains in production as of end
of 2018, with over 100 of these with a market capitalization of over $30M USD 2. This diversity of well-capitalized
public platforms reveals a limitation of blockchain technology: distinct blockchain constructions are required to
address the vast problem-space.
It’s not obvious if there will ever exist a sufficiently-generic blockchain platform, with enough transaction
capacity, “to rule them all”3; a menagerie of specialized blockchains may become the status-quo.
In the interim, solutions are needed to interoperate between these purpose-specific and/or throughput-constrained
blockchains, in order to broaden the scope and capabilities of applications that can be built on these platforms.
1.3 Use Cases
The ability for blockchains to access foreign blockchain-state (contingent on some finality criteria) makes pos-
sible a variety of applications which were primarily the realm of centralized solutions; notable use-cases include
payment-versus-delivery, payment-versus-payment, cross-chain-oracles and other general-purpose inter-chain pro-
tocols for assets and information. Two of such use cases have been of particular public interest of late:
1. Decentralized exchanges: As of this writing, all major multi-crypto exchanges (conceptually) consist of a
centralized server responsible for taking and clearing orders. Interoperability infrastructure enables cross-
chain exchanges to be built in a completely decentralized way: smart contracts on supported chains coordi-
nating to take and clear orders without centralized intervention.
1This assumes smart contract language expressivity and availability of cryptographic primitives common to most blockchains which are
categorized as smart-contract enabled.
2Data sourced from coinmarketcap.com on December 30, 2018; used the ”Not Mintable” and ”Market Cap” properties of reported crypto-
currencies to construct this claim.
3There seems to be an arms race today between several well-capitalized public blockchain organizations (Ethereum, IOHK, Parity, EOS,
etc.) to invent a public blockchain platform “to-rule-them-all”, with diverse hypotheses on scaling.
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2. Portable assets: The ability to issue assets that can be transported between blockchains without violating
the properties of said asset (fungibility, ownership, value, etc.) has been of great interest to create productive
(smart-contract-based) economical systems and legal frameworks spanning multiple blockchains.
2 Interoperability Definition
So far, we’ve invoked the term “interoperability” without much precision; let’s precisely define the term now.
When speaking about interoperability, we are concerned with establishing a causal relationship between events
on two blockchain (isolated systems). Two4 possible models exist to establish a relationships between events which
need to be correlated (the task of interoperability) [1]: causation and dependency.
Assume we have two blockchains BA and BB, that must interoperate:
1. Causation: some internal event on one blockchain causes a correlated internal event to occur on another
blockchain.
(a) Forward causation: event X on BA⇒ event Y on BB.
(b) Reverse causation: event V on BB⇒ event W on BA.
2. Dependency: some external event causes a pair of internal events to occur on both BA and BB (i.e. both
blockchain events correlated by the same external event).
(a) E.g. external event Z⇒ (event X on BB AND event Y on BA).
From the perspective of certain applications, a dependency relationship may be sufficiently expressive (e.g. an
oracle publishing the same data stream to multiple blockchains). But most interoperability relationships, particu-
larly the ones described in section 1, require the structure of causation for their articulation. For the purposes of
this paper, when we say:
“Two blockchains interoperate”,
we mean:
“There exists a mechanism to establish causation between transactions sealed onto distinct blockchains5”.
3 Design-Space
This section outlines the trade-offs available to the authors with respect to available interoperability architectures.
A multi-signature notary scheme was the implementation-strategy of choice for the TWC protocol, since it
provided a reasonable trade-off between decentralization (by opting into a well-defined trust model), ease-of-
implementation, system reliability and on-chain data-amplification.
Three families of interoperability mechanisms were identified for analysis:
1. Time-locks (hash locks)
2. Relaying (validate-one-chain-inside-another)
3. Notary schemes
An exposition of each of these methods is provided to highlight key design trade-offs; a more nuanced discus-
sion of these mechanisms is available in [1] and [5].
3.1 Time Locks (Hash Locking)
These systems comprise of some time-locked operation across two chains, which triggers on the revelation of the
pre-image of a one-way function. We illustrate this concept with the well-known example of hash locking (a.k.a.
“atomic swaps”):
Assume entities X and Y need to swap some asset that exists on two distinct chains (B1 and B2). Assume some
asset C1 is owned by X on B1 and asset C2 is owned by Y on B2. Furthermore, users X and Y have accounts on
both blockchains (XB1, XB2, YB1, YB2). There exists some well-defined time interval T. Also assume some ideal
hash function H.
1. X generates a secret S and generates a hash H(S) and sends H(S) to Y.
4Coincidence is a third possible relationship, but it can be safely ignored since its likelihood is heuristically understood to be minuscule.
5The blockchains have different genesis blocks and share no history.
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2. XB1 locks asset C1 on B1 with the following conditions:
(a) If S is revealed within time 2T, C1 is transferred to YB1,
(b) Else, C1 is transferred back to XB1.
3. After Y sees X lock asset C1 on B1, Y uses their account on B2 (YB2) to lock asset C2 with the following
conditions:
(a) If S is revealed within time T, C1 is transferred to XB2,
(b) Else, C2 is transferred back to YB2.
4. X reveals secret S on B2 to claim C2.
5. Y observes S on B2 and publishes it on B1 to claim C1.
3.1.1 Analysis
Several implementations and discussions of this scheme exist [2, 3]; the discussion on this topic here is limited in
so far as it illustrates the following relevant facts about this system:
1. The protocol is only capable of defining a dependency relationship between events on the two blockchains
(B1 and B2); in our illustration, the asset transfer events on B1 and B2 are dependent on the revelation of the
pre-image of the hash.
2. This protocol requires a high degree of interactivity; each user (X and Y) is required to interact with both
blockchains at least once, in addition to off-chain (real-time) requirements of observing and reacting to
events on a blockchain.
3.2 Relaying
This mechanism relies on the destination chain BD, validating the consensus rules of the source chain BS (making
the destination chain effectively a “light-client” of the source chain). An event (ED) on the BD can now depend on
an event (ES) on BS through light-client verification techniques available for the BS (e.g. providing a Merkle-proof
for ES’s membership in a block on BS). Let’s illustrate this with an example:
Assume two blockchains, source chain (BS) and destination chain (BD), which both have the following proper-
ties:
1. They have the notion of the block headers, which is a data structure whose hash can uniquely identify a
block [7].
2. The block headers are some finite, well-defined size that is much smaller than the full block contents.
3. They collect all transfers included in a block into a Merkle tree, and then store the root of that tree in the
block header.
4. The consensus rules can be validated completely by examining the block headers.
Now let’s construct a smart contract RD that has functions that:
1. Accepts block headers from the source blockchain BS, validates the consensus rules of the source blockchain
and maintains a “light-replica” of BS in the form of a chain of block headers.
2. Accepts a transaction hash, a Merkle proof and a source block number, and validates that the transaction was
sealed in the source chain.
Now one could imagine constructing a smart contract on BD that leverages our relay contract RD to accept
proof-of-inclusion of some transaction that occurred on BS before executing its logic. This effectively allows one
to establish a forward causation relationship (section 2) between BS and BD.
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3.2.1 Analysis
One powerful property of this system is that it’s completely trustless:
1. The relay contract RD enforces the source chain’s consensus rules in a trustless smart contract (publicly
auditable)
2. Anyone can run a process to relay (hence the name) the source chain (BS) block headers to RD. Notice that
liveness of the whole system is dependent on at-least one relaying entity being online.
But there are some problems with this system:
1. The amount of data required on the destination chain is proportional to the size of all the source chain’s block
headers since its origin block. This can be problematic due to block size limitations on the destination chain.
This can be further exacerbated by an impedance mismatch between the chains; if the source chain’s block
time is much faster than the destination blockchain, then the size of the source block headers per destination
block can become a significant proportion of the block limit. Several solutions to this problem have been
proposed in [6] and [4], and are actively under investigation.
2. This scheme requires the re-implementation of the consensus algorithm in the smart-contract language of
the destination chain. In a world with diverse blockchains, there are several problems with this approach:
(a) Blockchain platforms use a diverse range of cryptographic primitives to validate their consensus al-
gorithms; most smart contract languages currently have limited support for cryptographic primitives
other than the ones used natively.
(b) Even if all the required primitives to validate the diversity of consensus algorithm implementations
were universally available, re-implementing the same algorithm across a non-trivial number of plat-
forms carries significant operational risk and costs.
In the opinion of the authors, exclusive usage of relaying to power a flexible interoperability solution requires
further research and system design.
3.3 Notary Schemes
In this scheme, some external (notary) entity is allowed to make claims on one blockchain about what happened
on another blockchain. For this to work, the blockchain must trust the notary entity to honestly make claims about
some other external blockchain.
Since a primary design goal of blockchains is decentralization, a combination of several strategies can be used
to mitigate fragilities which arise from trusting a single external entity:
1. Use a set of well-known entities, who are disincentivized to deviate from protocol, either via reputation-at-
stake mechanism or bonded financial resources.
2. Force the notary entities to put up financial stake, which they can stand to lose if they misbehave.
3. Have a plurality (some appropriately large number) of signatories, who need to agree on the same value,
either interactively via a consensus algorithm, or non-interactively via a multi-signature scheme.
3.3.1 Analysis
This scheme offers the most versatility in establishing causation relationships between transactions on two blockchains
with diverse structures and capabilities; since the relay and signatory processes can be implemented in any general-
purpose language, they serve to translate between two blockchains. Let’s illustrate this idea with an example:
Assume two distinct, interoperating blockchains B1 → B2 use different asymmetric cryptographic systems
(Ω1, Ω2) and one-way functions (H1, H2). Since the signatory processes are implemented on some general-
purpose computation platform (e.g. linux on AMD64), there is no restriction on the crypto-system which can be
implemented therein. The smart contract implementation on B2 only needs to understand Ω2; the signatory can
cryptographically attest to its observations of B1 using Ω2.
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3.4 Architecture Selection
At the time of authorship of the TWC framework report, a notary scheme with a well-defined trust model was con-
sidered the best path to a production interoperability solution in the very short term; absolute decentralization was
traded-off against its flexibility in enabling a uniform interoperability solution across a diversity of blockchains.
Hash locking was precluded from consideration on part of its inability to express causality relationships be-
tween chains.
Although the relaying scheme offers very attractive decentralization properties, write amplification and limita-
tions of today’s smart contract platforms make a uniform implementation across a diversity of blockchains infea-
sible in the short term. As capabilities of smart contract platforms improve, this will become a more compelling
architecture for interoperability.
4 System Overview
4.1 Design Objectives
The following objectives were adhered-to when making system-level design decisions:
1. Keep-it-simple: a simpler protocol is heuristically less error-prone and easier to reason about.
2. Favor safety: the protocol should favor safety (primarily when trade-off is against liveness).
3. Minimize interactivity: the protocol should require minimal interactivity from the end user; it should make
no assumptions about the online-ness of the user of the protocol, beyond those made by the blockchain where
a transaction originates.
4.2 Protocol Description
This section provides an overview of the (a detailed description is available in section 5).
For the purposes of this discussion, this protocol is modelled as a message passing mechanism between a
source blockchain and a destination blockchain. Note that the protocol is bi-directional; the unidirectional case is
presented for expository purposes. The reverse information flow is simply a dual (symmetric in the other direction).
The simple construction is as follows:
1. A message M gets sealed into block NS on a source blockchain BS.
2. Wait for FS blocks to elapse on source blockchain BS (FS being the acceptable finality on source chain).
3. At some time ε after block number NS + FS is sealed on BS, message M gets sealed into block ND onto the
destination blockchain BD. (Note that ε models the time required for the “message pasting action” to take
place).
4. Wait for FD blocks to elapse on destination chain BD (FD being the acceptable finality on the destination
chain).
The above construction contained nothing about how the system works, merely what it does. In order to
describe how the protocol works, we first outline the actors involved and their responsibilities; we then summarize
the interactions between them.
1. Blockchain (BS, BD): source and destination blockchains respectively, for some message M.
2. Signatories (Sn, n> 0): passive entities, which upon the request of the relay, make independent observations
on source blockchain (BS) and attest to the
(a) History (when M was sealed onto BS) and,
(b) Contents of M.
3. Relay (R): coordinates the flow of the message from source to destination chain:
(a) Actively monitors BS for any messages addressed to be replicated on BD.
(b) Collect signatures on the history and content of M from 2/3 of Sn.
(c) Send a transaction to BD containing M.
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We need one more bit of exposition, before we’re ready reveal the protocol in its entirety. So far we have been
suspiciously vague about the nature of the message M, so let’s define that now.
The system assumption we made at the outset of this document is that the blockchains are being “bridged”
must:
1. Have a sufficiently expressive smart contract language to define arbitrary user-defined functions, and
2. Must implement language primitives necessary to validate signature (the signature algorithm can be any-
thing).
The message M at the source blockchain is a transaction containing message M, that is the successful execution
of the “egress” function requestTransfer(message) on a smart contract we refer to as the “Adapter” well known
to Relay (R). The implementation of the requestTransfer(message) function must adhere to the specs defined in
section 5.
The message M at the destination blockchain is a transaction that consumes the message generated from the
egress function of the Adapter contract deployed on the source blockchain. In particular, the destination smart
contract must implement the “ingress” function processTransfer(message, signatures) as defined in section 5.
In particular, the message M is composed of two features:
1. History: when M was sealed onto BS
2. Contents: a binary payload encoding the desired function call and arguments on the destination chain (as
defined in section 5)
Figure 1: Summarizes the “happy path” of the protocol in its entirety.
4.3 Trust Model
The trust model is implemented entirely in the destination smart contract. The destination smart contract must
implement the following rules:
1. The smart contract must have access to a pre-defined list of Nsig Signatories (public keys) whose signatures
on the history and contents of M it implicitly trusts.
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2. The smart contract must define a Relay (address) which is the only entity allowed to post ingress messages
to the contract.
3. The ingress function processTransfer(message, signatures) shall implement the following rules:
(a) At least 2/3 of Nsig signatures are required before message is processed.
(b) Only the Relay is allowed invoke this function.
As it’s obvious from the construction, the entire trust model is encoded in the destination smart contract. A
quorum of signatories is responsible for attestation of the source message; i.e. as long as a two-thirds majority of
the signatories agree that message M was observed on the source chain, the destination chain accepts that as fact
and proceeds to process M.
Furthermore, in this model, the Relay entity (R) is trustless; the dependency in the trust model exists only as a
first-order implementation of a ”paranoid fencing” system a service-provider might implement to ensure contract
invocation by trusted accounts to prevent public exploitation of bugs discovered in the production smart contract.
This framework is not opinionated in the incentive mechanisms for the Relay to continue providing service; these
incentives can be implemented in an application-by-application basis (at the smart contract level). The cost of the
transfer is borne by the Relay entity, which serves as a built-in denial-of-service deterrent.
4.4 Safety and Liveness
We provide a crude sketch for the safety and liveness arguments for this system.
4.4.1 Safety Sketch
For the purposes of this sketch, we use the heuristic definition of safety: “nothing bad will ever happen”. The
safety of this system is dependent on the set of signatories and the smart contract implementation. The safety of
the system can be guaranteed if:
1. At-least two-thirds (2/3) of the signatories make faithful observations on the source blockchain BS’s main-
chain, and
2. If all protocol constraints defined in section 5 are implemented correctly in the ingress function on the
Adapter contract on the destination chain (BD).
4.4.2 Liveness Sketch
For the purposes of this sketch, we use the heuristic definition of liveness: “something good will eventually hap-
pen”. The liveness of the system is dependent on the set of signatories, the relay and the blockchains involved. The
liveness of system can be guaranteed if:
1. The liveness of the blockchains being “bridged” is not violated,
2. At-least two-thirds (2/3) of the signatories respond to requests for signatures from the Relay within some
pre-defined time (synchrony),
3. Some entity is providing a Relay service with liveness guarantees.
Notice that the relay is only responsible for liveness; it needs to be always online and maintain at least one
connection to each of the blockchain clients being “bridged”. If the relay is byzantine and the signatories are not,
the system comes to the halt (i.e. messages are not replicated on the destination chain) and no malicious messages
get delivered to the destination chain.
A more in-depth discussion of the failure and liveness of the system is available in section 6.
5 Protocol Specification
This section provides a high-level description of the TWC operation and usage. The TWC is split into 4 compo-
nents:
1. Developer defined smart contract
2. Adapter contract
3. TWC bridge node
4. TWC signatories
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5.1 Developer Defined Smart Contract
This smart contract is any contract or application defined by the developer; the TWC places no restrictions on the
functionality or implementation of the contract. Initial use cases are expected to be cross chain asset movement,
however, the TWC is a generic protocol allowing for the transfer of any arbitrary data; not just that of representing
assets.
Any interoperable smart contract must implement a function to form the ABI encoded data and call request-
Transfer of its corresponding Adapter. Optionally, the source smart contract should contain developer defined
external remediation functionality. The security model section 6.1 provides details for scenarios which may cause
inconsistencies between the source and destination chains.
5.2 Adapter Contract
The Adapter contract is the primary interface between the TWC node and the developer defined smart contract. At
the very least, the Adapter should be initialized by providing a valid set of signatories, Relayer account address,
minimum number of required signatures and cross-chain transfer fee. Additionally, an authorized set of senders
should be provided if the request initiators are to be validated. The core functionality of the Adapter is to:
1. Accept incoming messages (encoded function calls) from developer smart contracts or applications through
requestTransfer.
(a) Assign a nonce to each transfer and charge usage fees as specified by the owner. Optionally, it may
also verify senders, preventing unauthorized users from initiating cross chain transfers.
(b) Emit outgoing message events to be picked up by TWC (BridgeTransferRequested)
2. Accept incoming messages from the TWC node (identified by the Relayer account) through processTransfer.
(a) Verify transfer signatures against the current set of signatories and threshold.
(b) Maintain a list of processed messages and reject duplicate messages.
(c) Track nonces of previously sent messages and reject out-of-order transfers.
(d) Call developer smart contracts.
(e) Emit events indicating the transfer status (Processed/AlreadyProcessed).
Detailed functionality and source code of Adapter contracts is provided in Appendix C.
5.3 TWC Bridge Node
The TWC bridge node is the primary component connecting two distinct blockchains and it is responsible for the
following:
1. Monitor connecting chain status
2. Monitor Adapter smart contract events
3. Process transfer requests
• Extract transfer data from source chain events
• Maintain transfer order based on a sequential nonce
• Request signatures
• Send transfers to the destination chain
• Monitor transfer status
5.3.1 Monitoring Connecting Chain Status
The TWC node must monitor the status of both BS and BD. Monitoring the status of a blockchain will vary
depending on chain properties, thus specifics are left to the implementation. In a general sense, chain status
must encompass at least liveliness and reorganization. Liveliness refers to the generation of new blocks, while
reorganization events lead to a chain’s history being re-written or switching to a different branch.
In addition to monitoring chain status the TWC must also respond when detecting incorrect behavior. Re-
sponses will vary by implementation however there are 3 strategies that may be followed:
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1. Pause operation until operator intervention
2. Retry operations as needed
3. Continue as normal
5.3.2 Monitoring Adapter Smart Contract Events
In order to detect transfer requests and responses, TWC node must monitor each connecting blockchain for events
generated by the Adapter contracts. From the source Adapter the TWC must monitor the following events:
• BridgeTransferRequested: Specifies a new transfer
From the destination Adapter the TWC must monitor the following events:
• Processed: Indicates a transfer has been processed.
• AlreadyProcessed: Indicates a submitted transfer was previously processed and has been resubmitted.
5.3.3 Processing Transfer Requests
Processing transfer requests is the primary role of the TWC node and it is performed in the following steps:
1. Detect a BridgeTransferRequested event from BS.
2. Extract transfer details from the transfer request.
3. Create a signing request.
4. Send signing request to all Sn for verification and signatures.
5. Collect signatures and create a transfer transaction.
6. Submit the transfer to BD.
7. Monitor BD to ensure the transfer transaction is successful.
8. Listen for Processed or AlreadyProcessed events from the Adapter smart contract.
In addition to processing transfer requests, TWC nodes must also provide a guarantee on transaction ordering i.e.
the TWC must process transactions in the same order as they occur on the source chain.
5.4 TWC Signatories
The primary function of the signatories is to process signature requests, validate transactions and finally sign valid
transfers. Transfer sign requests contain the minimal amount of data needed for verification:
• Source chain block number
• Source chain block hash
• Source chain transaction hash
• Source chain transaction data hash
Using the block number, block hash and transaction hash signatories must:
1. Fetch the specified block in order to ensure their view of the chain is the same as that of the TWC node.
2. Fetch the specified transaction, take a hash of transaction data and compare it to the provided transaction
data hash.
3. Given the provided transaction data hash and calculated data hash are equal, the signatories will sign the
transaction data hash using their private key.
TWC nodes collect these signatures in order to attest to an event occurring on the source chain.
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6 Failure Modes
Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains as a standalone data structure and application share several common attack
vectors and behaviors, these include:
1. 51% attacks leading to reversion of transactions.
2. 51% attacks leading to transaction censorship.
3. 51% attacks leading to the creation of an invalid chain which is detected by full nodes. However, light nodes
may accept the invalid chains.
4. Soft forks.
5. Hard forks (bulk of the user bases switches to the new chain).
6. Network splitting into multiple fragments.
7. Consistency favoring chains halting due to a network issue.
Any one of these events may cause serious issues for a single chain; interoperability between chains amplifies
the effects of each of these events. Cross-chain application developers must be cognizant of chain failure events
and build chain failure checks into their applications. Even when handling chain events within an application
developers and operators must be ready with off-chain solutions; certain cases detailed in the following section
may not be detectable until it is too late to stop the invalid cross chain transaction. These cases will require an
off-chain solution to correct the invalid state introduced on the destination chain.
During exceptional circumstances chains may become compromised prompting emergency responses such as
the DAO or bitcoin overflow fork. The TWC significantly complicates these types of forks, once a message has
been sent across the TWC, a fork on the source chain cannot reverse transactions on the destination chain. These
types of events have the potential to lead to attacks such as double spending of transferred assets on the destination
chain. While these types of events are extraordinarily rare, developers and operators should be aware of the impact
of these types of events.
Given the current state of blockchain technology; without radically changing blockchain implementations a
fully decentralized, failure proof solution is impossible to achieve. Some sort of trade-off between risk, centraliza-
tion and interactivity must be made by interoperability solutions, broadly these may be defined as:
• Centralization: The level of control a single actor may exert over a system; given a fully centralized system
a single actor may fully control cross chain functionality while in a fully decentralized system no one actor
may control cross chain functions.
• Risk: The level of risk operators are willing to accept. A higher level of risk may simplify operation and
increase throughput, however, chain events may be exploited to create invalid states on the destination chain.
• Interactivity: The level of interaction required by users in order to validate bridge operation. As the level
of interaction increases, users are always expected to be online and monitor the operation; should users be
offline invalid transactions may be submitted and accepted on the destination chain.
The TWC and notary-based schemes in general choose to trade centralization for interactivity. Very little inter-
activity beyond initiating the transfer is required from the user. However, to achieve the low level of interactivity
the TWC must inherently trust its set of signatories to validate and attest to the validity of transfers.
The remainder of the section focuses more specifically on the security model and vulnerabilities in the de-
scribed notary based TWC bridging solution.
6.1 Security Model
The security model of the TWC is provided by the signatories making faithful observations of the source chain as
well as the Adapter contracts. Given these constraints, no single compromised system component may compromise
the entire system.
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6.1.1 Risk and Impact
Before exploring the TWC security model a ranking is assigned to the risk of exploiting an attack vector and the
potential impact a compromised party may have on the TWC. Impact is examined from the view of contracts
entering invalid states. Propagation of invalid transactions to the destination chain exponentially increases the
damaging impact of an attack.
Risk levels:
• Low: Attack requires multiple independent parties to be simultaneously compromised.
• Medium: Attack requires a single party to be fully compromised.
• High: Attack may proceed without any parties fully compromised.
Impact levels:
• Low: It may temporarily shut down a bridge and cause inconvenience. No data will be corrupted on either
BS or BD and no external remediation is required.
• Medium: One or more bridges are totally censored and unable to transfer transactions. No corruption of
contract states; minor remedial actions may be required mainly in configuration changes.
• High: BS or BD contract state corrupted. Possible double spend attacks, theft or complete contract state
invalidation. Remediation will likely be required by the contract owner (if possible).
6.2 Single Party Compromise
6.2.1 Source Chain Infrastructure (Risk: Low, Impact: Low-High)
A compromised source chain is defined as at least 2/3 of connections to BS providing faulty data, causing the bridge
to detect and process incorrect data. The impact of such an attack may be broken up into two scenarios:
• Individual nodes return incorrect data; however, the chain itself is intact and signatories follow the original
chain. In this scenario, there will be no impact on the destination chain; signatories will reject the invalid
transactions and they will not be submitted to the destination chain.
• Signatory chain connections may also return invalid data. This may cause the destination contract to reach an
invalid state. Such a scenario is equivalent to multiple parties or the entire source chain being compromised,
and will be explored further in section 6.3.
6.2.2 Destination Chain Infrastructure (Risk: Low, Impact: Low)
A compromised destination chain is defined as at least 2/3 of connections to BD providing faulty data. The impact
of this attack is quite low as actions are triggered by the source chain. At worst an attacker may be able to stall the
bridge or cause it to shut down due to inconsistent messages. Attacks of this nature may be mitigated by moving
to alternative chain connections where bridge operation may resume.
6.2.3 Adapter Contract (Risk: Medium, Impact: High)
The Adapter contract is a critical piece of the TWC, thus compromising it on either the source or destination chain
may have quite serious consequences. In order to compromise an Adapter, an attacker needs to gain access to its
owner’s private key. Adapter owner account can modify important properties such as authorized senders, signatory
public keys and Relayer address. Combining a subset of these changes will allow an attacker to corrupt the state
of user contracts on either BS or BD. Attacks could be performed on source or destination functionality.
One possible attack on the source side would be to modify the authorized sender list to allow an attacker to use
their own contract to generate transfer requests in the place of a user’s contract. This will allow attackers to bypass
a user’s defined logic by substituting their own. The TWC node and signatories have no way of distinguishing the
original source of the transaction, thus the transfer will appear valid. The message will be sent to the destination
chain and accepted by the destination Adapter; setting an invalid state on the destination contract.
A possible attack on the destination would modify the set of signatory public keys as well as the Relayer
account; giving an attacker the ability to send any message to the destination contract, completely cutting out
the TWC node and signatories. Invalid messages would have the ability to set an invalid state in the destination
contract.
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Attacks of this nature are less TWC specific and are more a generic class of attacks on all smart contracts; once
an owner’s private key has been compromised it is inevitable that the attacker will gain a large amount of control
over the contract; which he may exploit in malicious ways. The extent of the damage an attacker could do in the
context of TWC is difficult to quantify as different contracts will have different levels of access.
The TWC protocol spec regarding Adapters mandates each change in the contract to generate a corresponding
event. While the spec does not specify monitoring and usage of those events, a TWC node or an external process
could be set to monitor them. If an unexpected change is detected, the monitoring process could take emergency
measures such as shutting down the TWC to ensure those changes do not allow cross-chain attacks.
6.2.4 Bridge Node (Risk: Medium, Impact: Low)
A compromised bridge may perform 4 types of malicious behaviors:
1. Request signatories to sign invalid transactions: Signatories independently verify each signing request;
without locating and verifying the corresponding transaction on the source chain, a signatory will not sign the
request. Therefore, sending invalid transactions for signatures will not impact bridge, source or destination
chains.
Stemming from this type of attack is attempting to flood signatories with invalid signature requests. Attacks
of this nature may be mitigated by rate limiting each connection. A malicious bridge may max out its own
connection, however, this will not negatively affect other bridges.
2. Send invalid transactions to the destination chain: The destination chain Adapter will verify each signa-
ture based on its configuration. As the bridge is unable to falsify signatures, the destination chain will detect
invalid transactions and reject them.
3. Censor transactions: All events are assigned a nonce (transferId) by the source Adapter contract allowing
the destination Adapter to detect missing transactions and reject out of order nonces. Attempting to censor
a transaction will lead to a bridge stalling as the destination chain will not process transactions until the
expected nonce is submitted. While this will stop the following legitimate transactions, we believe it is
an acceptable trade-off since it will immediately alert the bridge operator and users of incorrect behavior,
allowing them to act accordingly.
4. Replay transactions: A compromised bridge may store signed transactions and replay them later, without
having to request signatures from signatories. Destination Adapter maintains a history of all processed
transactions; hence, replayed transactions will be rejected by the Adapter.
6.2.5 Signatories (Risk: Low, Impact: Medium)
A compromised signatory set is defined as at least 2/3 of Sn censoring transactions; either by refusing to sign
validation requests or by providing incorrect signatures.
• Refusal to sign: In this scenario signatories will simply stop replying to bridge requests, allowing them to
time out. A bridge will not be able to distinguish this case from a network error and will respond in the
same fashion. Without noting specific implementation details the only option a bridge will have is to re-try
sending the message, either indefinitely or for some period before giving up on the request. The state on the
destination chain will not be corrupted.
• Incorrect signatures: In this scenario signatories will reply to validation requests, however, the replies
will contain invalid signatures. Bridge performs cursory checks on signatures, but since it is unaware of
the specifics of a signature, it is unable to verify it. If the signatures pass all cursory checks, the bridge
will forward the transfer to the destination chain. This transfer will fail the signature validation step in the
Adapter contract and the state will not be modified.
In both scenarios the state of the destination contract will be protected by either the bridge or the Adapter
contract. Messages on the source chain may be stuck in a pending state while signatory functionality is restored;
however, no messages will ever be lost. While inconvenient, bridge operators may switch the signatory set to begin
processing backlogged messages or simply wait till the signatory behavior is corrected.
6.2.6 Operator (Risk: Low/Medium, Impact: Medium/High)
An operator is a special actor within the TWC owning a significant share of the TWC infrastructure, as such the
operator has a great deal of control over the TWC. Due to the high level of access in the user defined contract, the
operator is generally seen as controlling the TWC node and Adapter contracts; in most cases they will also control
the user contract however this is not strictly required. Consequently, an operator will have access to the following:
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• Relayer account keys
• Adapter owner keys
• User contract owner keys
• TWC node operation
Ideally the operator’s role would be split among at least 3 entities: relay owner, Adapter owner and user contract
owner. Operators are strongly encouraged to use separate keys for deploying their smart contracts and setting
up the Relayer account. The exact level of risk and impact for this scenario largely depends on the deployment
standards followed by the operator; a simple change in account management stops a single compromised account
from cascading and compromising the entire system.
An important aspect of this threat model is that operators are simultaneously incentivized to secure their keys
and disincentized from using the TWC to performing attacks on their own contracts. This is analogous to mining
pools performing attacks on their own network; doing so would simply destroy the pool’s reputation and income
stream. Mining pools are encouraged to act honestly and secure their operation to ensure an attacker could not gain
access. Similarly, operators are encouraged to act honestly as exploiting their access to attack their own DApps
would destroy their reputation and application.
An attacker will have limited capabilities in the scenario of an operator’s keys becoming compromised; given
a separate set of keys were used for each deployment.
• Relayer account: The set of actions an attacker could perform is a subset of those an attacker could perform
in compromising the TWC node. Ultimately the Adapters will identify and reject any invalid messages.
• Adapter owner account: Compromising the Adapter account is considered in section 6.2.3.
• User contract: This attack vector is outside of the scope of the TWC, attacks will largely depend on func-
tionality in the user contract.
• TWC Node: Compromising a TWC bridge node is considered in section 6.2.4.
The scenario of an operator’s keys becoming compromised where the key is used in multiple deployments is
equivalent to a multi-party compromise (considered in section 6.3).
6.3 Multi-Party Compromise
The inherent trust model of the bridge and signatories in a notary model may result in multi-party compromise
leading to catastrophic errors on the destination chain. Due to the high number of possible pairings only one of the
most serious scenarios will be covered.
6.3.1 Bridge and Signatories (Risk: Low, Impact: High)
The destination chain relies on the bridge and signatories as its source of truth about the source chain. Given a
compromised bridge and signatory set, a bridge may create any transaction; regardless of occurrence on the source
chain. Compounding the issue, the compromised signatory set will sign the invalid transactions. Once the invalid
transaction is transmitted to the destination chain, from the point of view of the destination contract, the transaction
will be deemed valid. The destination chain will successfully validate the signatures and modify the contract state
to an invalid state as specified in the falsified transaction.
Consider a transfer of value from a compromised bridge and signatory set; attackers may mint any number
of tokens on the destination chain. Once minted, these tokens are indistinguishable from real tokens. Assuming
enough liquidity exists, an attacker may transfer their tokens back to the original chain and sell their newly minted
tokens. An attack of this nature may modify the total supply of a token; possibly fundamentally breaking the
original smart contract. This attack may only be rectified through intervention and direct modification of the smart
contract state by the contract owner.
7 Conclusion
Given the current state of blockchain technology, without fundamentally modifying aspects of the blockchain, there
is no perfect interoperability solution. This paper presents a review of three classes of interoperability solutions;
time-locks, relaying and notary schemes. Given the trade-offs between interactivity, functionality and centraliza-
tion we present the TWC; a notary-based generic message passing framework for inter-blockchain communication.
As a notary-based framework the TWC trades a decrease in interactivity for an increase in centralization.
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The security model provides a fault tolerant interoperability framework where a party may become com-
promised without compromising the entire system. However, due to the centralization trade-off, once mul-
tiple components become compromised an attacker may gain the ability to send malicious messages between
blockchains. Even assuming no multi-compromise, bridge operators must still acknowledge the risk of deep chain
re-organization, either by malicious actors or a coordinated fork event. Operators must be ready to step in and
rectify issues caused by a deep chain re-organization deep in the chain history.
None of the time lock, notary or relay-based frameworks provide the perfect solution for interoperability,
however, the TWC presents a starting point for generic inter-blockchain message passing.
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Appendix A Safety Conjecture for Interoperability
We aim to informally illustrate the following:
Safety cannot be guaranteed for an (interoperability) system that establishes forward causality relationships be-
tween transactions on two distinct chains, where the chain which is the source for these transactions has proba-
bilistic finality.
A.1 Problem Sketch
• Step I: Build a simple model for a system that establishes a forward causality relationship between transac-
tions on two blockchains (i.e. a bridge)
• Step II: Precisely define a reasonable safety property of such a system.
• Step III: Argue that the safety property of the interoperability system cannot be satisfied due to a dependent
safety property of the source blockchain.
A.2 Step I: Problem Modelling
Assume the following construction for a system that establishes a forward causality relationship between transac-
tions on two blockchains (referred-to as a “bridge”):
1. Transaction X1 exists on B1 at block N1, sealed at time T.
2. F1 is the count of blocks elapsed since N1 at which point X1 can be considered “sufficiently final”.
3. Transaction X2 exists on B2.
4. X2 has a causal relationship to X1 (i.e. X1⇒ X2).
5. X2 was sealed onto B2 at block N1 + F1, at time T + TF (let TF = time to produce F1 blocks on B1)
6. Block production rates for B1 and B2 are roughly similar (impedance matching).
7. Let C1 be the set of claims that are invariant for blockchain B1 at block number N1 + F1. (e.g. account ϕ has
balance of 0 at block number N1 + F1).
8. Let C2 be the set of claims that are invariant for blockchain B2 at some time corresponding to B1’s block
number N1 + F1.
A.3 Step II: Safety Property Definition
Our working definition of a safety property is “[something undesirable] will not happen” . We define the primary
safety property of our “bridge” construction:
“For all time after block N1 + F1, the relationship X1⇒ X2 is an invariant in the set of claims C1∩C2”
Another way to state this property is that the safety of our bridge system is violated if there is a non-zero pos-
sibility that the causality X1⇒ X2 established at time T + TF may no-longer hold at some point in the future.
A.4 Step III: Proof Sketch
For blockchains with probabilistic-finality in their consensus (e.g. Bitcoin, Ethereum), after a block is “buried
under” sufficient proof of work, it is considered “sufficiently final”. For probabilistic-finality blockchains, the
closed-system assumption6 is central to the security model; under the closed-system assumption, blockchain reor-
ganizations are considered perfectly safe (by definition of their safety criterion). Although never formally stated,
safety criteria for probabilistic-finality blockchains7, in practice, is understood to be the following:
Assume the set of transactions (T1, ..., Tn), which successively depend on each other (i.e. for all n, Tn depends
on Tn−1). Assume these got sealed in the history of the blockchain at block N.
6The fact that the blockchain is a self-contained system. All security guarantees provided are reasoned about with this assumption in mind.
7Blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum
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Then, in the course of a re-organization to block N - M such that none of (T1, ..., Tn) exist in the history, no
guarantees are made about the re-inclusion of these transactions in the new history, other than if these transac-
tions are replayed, the transaction will NOT be included out-of-order.
It is perfectly reasonable that in the course of the reorganization, none or some partial contiguous series of trans-
actions get included (starting from T1) in the new history due to inclusion of other transactions conflicting with
one or more of the transactions in the set (T1, ..., Tn).
By definition of their safety property, these systems can indefinitely tolerate a non-zero probability of a “deep”
reorganization event.
Furthermore, it is easy to see from the definition of the safety criteria for a probabilistic-finality blockchain that
no event X1 sealed in a block Nn (n > 0) on chain B1 is an invariant of the chain. If the event X1 is the source
event in the forward causality relationship X1⇒ X2, it follows that this relationship also cannot be invariant (in the
intersection of the claims that are invariant for all chains).
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Appendix B Sample Operation Using TWC
This section outlines the steps to deploy and use the TWC adapter contracts.
Prerequisites:
1. Deploy Adapter contracts on both Aion and Ethereum. For each contract the following should be set:
(a) signatoryContractAddress: An address of a contract implementing the IBridgeSignatory interface,
storing the valid signatory information.
(b) relayer: An account address that will be used by the bridge to call the Adapter contract to process
transfers.
(c) signatoryQuorumSize: Minimum number of signatures required for a transfer request to be valid.
(d) transactionFee: Fee associated with performing each cross-chain bridge transaction.
(e) acceptOnlyAuthorizedSenders: Indicates whether only a pre-authorized set of accounts can request a
bridge message transfer.
2. Set the source adapter contract address. Aion adapter will store the Eth adapter address and vice versa.
3. Encoded function in the recipient contract should be accessible by the Adapter contract. Otherwise the
function call will fail.
Flow to send a cross-chain message transfer transaction is as follows:
• On the source side of the transfer:
1. User picks the destination contract, function name and arguments.
2. A user account or contract calls the requestTransfer function with the destination contract address and
encoded function call. Optionally the amount of gas that should be used by this function can be set as
well. The sender account should be accepted in the adapter contract.
For example, an encoded function call for
function setValue(uint128 v) { value = v; }
can be generated using one of the following ways:
(a) Solidity (v0.4.24):
abi.encodeWithSelector(bytes4(sha3(“setValue(uint128)”)), 1)
(b) Web3:
web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionCall(
{“name”: “setValue”, “type”: “function”, “inputs”: [{“type”: “uint128”, “name”: “ v”}] }
, [1]);
Furthermore, user should include the fee set in the contract with this transaction. If the amount sent is less
than transactionFee, transaction will be rejected. Otherwise the extra value will be transferred back to the
user.
• On the Bridge side:
If the requestTransfer transaction is successful, a BridgeTransferRequested event is generated which in-
cludes an associated Id (nonce). Bridge will listen for this event and send a request to signatories asking for
signatures. Signatories will validate the occurrence of the event and sign the hash of the transfer data. Hash
method is Keccak256 on Ethereum and Blake2b256 on Aion.
Hash (sourceTransactionHash, sourceAdapterAddress, recipientContract, encodedFunctionCall, gas, source-
TransferId, sourceNetworkId)
Once the required number of signatories have signed the hash, the bridge calls the processTransfer function
on the destination adapter.
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• On the destination side:
1. The processTransfer function is called by the Relayer account through the bridge.
2. Adapter contract checks the following conditions:
(a) Transaction hash should not have been processed before.
(b) Id the of the transfer request should be equal to the expected Id or nonce to maintain order between
chains.
(c) There should be enough signatures included as the input.
(d) Signatures should be valid
3. If the conditions pass,
(a) The recipient contract will be called with the encoded data.
(b) Transaction hash will be marked as processed.
(c) An event will be generated indicating the success of the transaction and the status of the function
call.
4. If the transaction hash has been processed before, an event is generated which includes the block
number in which the original processTransfer transaction was sealed. This can be used to track the
original transaction and ensure it’s finalized.
5. In other fail cases, transaction will be reverted.
Figure 2: Sequence diagram of the TWC protocol
18
Appendix C Contract code
We do not recommend using these contracts in a production environment. The code has not been fully tested or
audited. Smart contracts for both Aion and Ethereum can be found in https://github.com/aionnetwork/
transwarp_conduit
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